H.R. McMaster's Crib Notes on Future Wars

H.R. McMaster is a name history will remember. A leading theorist on the failures of the Vietnam war, McMaster is the author Dereliction of Duty, which was widely-read in the Pentagon and is considered authoritative on the subject of Vietnam military leadership. Quick summary of the book: a pox upon all the bastards' houses.

He's even more impressive in my young eyes (Viet-what?) as he is considered one of the creators of our successful counterinsurgency methods in Iraq. What he did in Tal Afar has been applied across Iraq, and everyone but President-to-be Obama can see it's worked great. (C'mon Barack, it's not that hard to say: "the surge worked." 3 simple words.) In any case, McMaster's a friggin' genius. I'm not alone in thinking that his theories and writings will be textbook material for U.S. leadership as we face new threats in the 21st century.

Anywho, he's got a new piece coming up in the Foreign Policy Research Institute's Orbis titled "Learning from Contemporary Conflicts to Prepare for Future War." You need the magazine for the full article, but here's a summarizing essay of sorts, based upon the full article.

Stuff that popped out to my untrained eye:

1.) These kinds of comments scream out to me that the small-war/counterinsurgency emphasis in military training is needed, but is hardly sufficient to answer the issues:

"Iran’s engagement in proxy wars through terrorist and insurgent groups in Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq, and Afghanistan demonstrates that the greatest danger to international security may lie at the intersection between hostile states and terrorist organizations. That is why the U.S. Joint Force must expand its ability to deter, coerce, or defeat nations that either threaten U.S. vital interests or attack those vital interests through proxies."

In other words, we need to take a small page from federal law enforcement's playbook, which has developed different divisions such as Organized Crime and White Collar to deal with wildly different criminal issues. The military would be poorly served by a continued focus on large-scale capabilities. We need to find ways besides direct action to make the mullahs toe the line. Personally, I can't see anyone in Tehran worrying that many of his operatives have been detained by coaltion forces. Perhaps its already being done, but we firstly need some good ol' spying. Turn some agents, grant others asylum to America. Y'know, the usual.

2.) Another trope that seems to be repeated quite often is the one along the lines of "human intelligence is irreplaceable." McMaster is definitely skeptical of the proclaimed advances in military technology, especially in re: counterinsurgency and asymmetrical warfare:

The major offensive operation that quickly toppled the Hussein regime in Iraq clearly demonstrated the possibilities associated with new technology, as well as the effects that improved speed, knowledge, and precision can have in the context of a large-scale offensive operation. However, the initial phases of the operation also revealed important continuities in warfare that lie beyond the reach of technology. Unconventional forces will continue to evade detection from even the most advanced surveillance capabilities. Moreover, what commanders most needed to know about enemy forces, such as their degree of competence and motivation, lay completely outside the reach of technology.

Amen. Until we get pre-cogs or an effective Able Danger* scheme, nothing, I repeat nothing will replace local knowledge and human interaction as strategically effective information. But such programs are inherently messy, often unsuccessful, and very time-money intensive. Such are the perils of national defense in a democracy, I suppose...

3.) And the award for Ridiculously Restrained Criticism of Head-In-The-Sand Leadership goes to Col. McMaster for this comment:

Some commanders and defense officials were slow to recognize the character of the conflicts in both Afghanistan and Iraq. Initial emphasis was on an attrition approach to the complex problem of growing insurgencies. Using technical intelligence and surveillance capabilities, U.S. forces attempted to defeat networked enemy organizations through attacking leadership and reducing critical capabilities.

"Slow to recognize." Riiight. Where as Tom Ricks tore some guys new orofices, McMaster's critiques are much more restrained but, under it all, you can still smell an equal amount of disdain. I love it.

4.) I'll blurb this part and then command you to go forthwith and ReadTheWholeThing. Now. Toot-sweet.

We need to reject the assertion that future war will differ fundamentally from recent and ongoing conflicts in order to protect future commanders from what could become a tendency toward risk aversion and over-control. Assuming information superiority might lead some commanders to conclude that making near-perfect decisions based on near-perfect intelligence is the essence of command. Commanders must be capable of conceptual thought and have the ability to communicate a vision of how the force will achieve its objectives.

Flexibility, y'all. Flexibility.

An extra link to the essay for you readers too lazy to scroll back to the top. I've been there.

P.S. 'H.R. McMaster' is one of the best names I've seen in the public eye, ever. He needs a nickname, but I'm drawing a blank on anything good. Submissions from the crowd, si vous plait.
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*Note that I'm not suggesting (a) Able Danger didn't work the first time or (b) that I even want an effective Able Danger style program. I'm not in-the-loop enough to speak to (a) and I'm enough of a squish civil-libertarian that I'm pretty sure I would vociferously protest such an outcome as (b).